Abstract Remuneration rates of German nursing homes are prospectively negotiated between long-term care insurance (LTCI) and social assistance on the one side and nursing homes on the other. They differ considerably across regions while there is no evidence for substantial differences in care provision. This article explains the differences in the remuneration rates by observable characteristics of the nursing home, its residents and its region with a special focus on the largest federal state of North Rhine Westphalia, in which the most expensive nursing homes are located. We use data from the German Federal Statistical Office for 2005 on all nursing homes that offer full-time residential care for the elderly. We find that differences in remuneration rates can partly be explained by exogenous factors. Controls for residents, nursing homes and district characteristics explain roughly 30 % of the price difference; 40 % can be ascribed to a regionally different kind of negotiation between nursing homes and LTCI. Thirty percent of the raw price difference remains unexplained by observable characteristics.
Introduction
The long-term care industry has experienced a dramatic growth over the last decade in Germany. In 2007, 2.25 million people were in need of long-term care (LTC) [1] . They are looked after by their relatives at home (1.03 million) or professional outpatient services (together with relatives) (0.50 million), or are residents in nursing homes (0.71 million). In 1999, 2.02 million people were in need of long-term care. Between 1999 and 2007, the number of residents in nursing homes had the steepest increase of 25 % from 0.57 million in 1999 [2] to 0.71 million today. The number of nursing homes went up from 8,900 in 1999 to 11,000 in 2007. Thus, the relevance of residential care in nursing homes has increased considerably in recent years. As residential care is an expensive form of long-term care, a public debate on the prices for residential care has started in recent years [3] [4] [5] . In Germany, remuneration rates are the result of a collective bargaining process between the LTCI and social assistance on behalf of payers and the nursing home. Residents do not participate in the negotiations. Remuneration rates are negotiated for each nursing home separately. Then, the prices are fixed until the next bargaining round only to be called in by the provider.
Since its introduction in 1996 the LTCI distinguishes between three levels of care (CL) with increasing severity of care: level I to level III. The level is formally assessed by an independent Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds. The remuneration rates (RR) are lowest in level I and highest in level III [6] . Within a level it is equal for all residents of a given nursing home. In addition residents pay for board and lodging (BL) and for those investment costs (ICs) that have not been publicly financed. Residents in a single room pay higher ICs while residents in double or larger rooms pay less. In total, the resident pays the sum of RR, BL and IC to the nursing home. For a given level of care, but independent of the remuneration rate of the nursing home, the LTCI refunds part of the total costs (see Table 1 ). Thus, the resident pays the gap between the individual remuneration rate and the benefit of the LTCI, which is on average around 50 %. The gap gets larger with higher remuneration rates and vice versa. If residents cannot pay the total gap, their children, relatives or-if neither can pay-social assistance has to step in.
The remuneration rates (prices) of nursing homes differ considerably across regions [7] (see Fig. 1 and Table 2 ) although the concept of long-term care is defined uniformly by social law. Clusters of regions with high prices are clearly distinguishable. The most expensive nursing homes can be found in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and in some regions of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. The least expensive nursing homes are located in Eastern Germany.
The question arises whether and how the observed price differences can be explained. International literature focusses on costs [8] [9] [10] [11] or profits [12] of nursing homes. Due to the unique price setting mechanism in Germany, we cannot rely on international empirical studies. In particular, there might be inefficiencies in the bargaining process. The LTCI as the leader of the negotiations for the payer side has no incentive to negotiate for cost savings as any markups are totally at the expense of the residents or social assistance [4] . Moreover, competition between nursing homes does not fully work: First, only recently public information on quality became available 1 . Second, mobility of new residents is typically very low such that they choose one of the few providers in their vicinity. In case of sudden need for residential care (e.g. after hospital discharge) the choice is reduced even further, because there is often only one local provider available. Third, for some residents social assistance pays the remaining gap between the actual price and LTCI refunds [5] .
This article analyses differences in prices between nursing homes in NRW and the comparable states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate by taking regional conditions, nursing home characteristics and resident structure into account. All analyses are based on a full sample of more than 6,000 nursing homes in 2005 [13] . The following section presents the data and outlines the estimation strategy. The ''Results'' section provides the results, which are discussed in ''Discussion'', and the ''Conclusion'' section concludes.
Data and methods
We use data from the Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the states that comprise a full sample of all 10,424 German nursing homes in 2005 [13] . They also include information on the more than 676,000 residents with the largest part of around 150,000 residents living in nursing homes located in NRW. Every second year, on 15 December, nursing homes are obliged to provide information about their ownership, total number of resident places and other structural information, e.g. the average number of beds per room, being part of a hospital, rehabilitation centre or another facility, and whether they additionally offer home care. There are three different types of ownership: private-for-profit, private notfor-profit, i.e. nursing homes owned by e.g. churches or charity groups, and public ones. Furthermore, the data allow us to distinguish between nursing homes that provide care for the elderly, for people with disabilities, for mentally disordered people or for the dying (hospices), and between full, short-and part-time residential care. Part time residential care means staying either overnight or during the day only.
Moreover, for each nursing home we have information about the number of residents, their age, gender, the nursing care level and the daily remuneration rate RR for each of the three care levels as well as costs for board and lodging. Unfortunately, there is no information about the investment costs in the data. Thus, we refer to the total remuneration rate (TRR) as the sum of RR and BL. As RR differs per level of care I to III, so does TRR. In order to measure the average price level of a nursing home i, we build the average total remuneration rate (ARR) as the weighted average of TRR I, II and III. Weights are the national average fraction of residents in level I, II and III. In 2005, on average 35 % of all residents were in care level I, 44 % in level II and 21 % in level III:
We refrain from using the individual distribution of the residents in each nursing home to avoid endogeneity problems: the distribution of the residents might depend on the remuneration rates for each care level. Additionally, nursing homes with e.g. low remuneration rates in all care levels could turn out to be expensive, because they have a higher proportion of residents in level III, thus resulting in a high average price due to the weights per level used for calculating the average. Finally, the data contain information on the nursing homes' staff. For each employee we can distinguish between full-and part-time contracts. There are four different working time intervals: ''full time'', ''more than 50 %'', ''less than 50 %'' and ''employees earning less than 400 euros per month'' 2 . Using the official conversion factors of the Federal Statistical Office, we are able to approximately calculate full-time equivalents (FTEs). Additionally, we complement the data with regional information about the administrative district. The Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning provides rich information on the 439 German districts in 2005 including income and the degree of rurality. Rurality indicates the average share of citizens in a district living in a rural area. Average regional income is defined as the average disposable income per citizen and year.
We focus on nursing homes offering full-time residential care for the elderly (in total 9,087 nursing homes in 2005). We exclude nursing homes for people with disabilities, mental disorders as well as hospices, because these nursing homes offer highly specialised services for persons with special needs. Hence, these nursing homes are not comparable with the vast majority of nursing homes caring for the elderly. Also for reasons of comparability we only include nursing homes in the six federal states mentioned above (6,184 homes). We exclude outliers: nursing homes with more than two FTEs per resident (24 observations) and those with inconsistent or missing price information (19 observations). With more than two FTEs per resident we have to assume coding errors in the data. These nursing homes would have more than triple the staffing levels in comparison to the average nursing home. This leaves us with a total sample size of 6,143 nursing homes. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the data for NRW and the other five federal states. The comparison states are shown individually and as a whole. The average cost of care is highest in NRW with €81.03 per day and lowest in Lower Saxony (€66.64 per day). Characteristics of the residents differ moderately: the share of residents in care level I varies between 30 and 37 % with a maximum difference across the federal states of 6 % points in care level II and 8 % points in care level III. The average age of the residents is nearly identical around 83 years. FTE per resident is highest in NRW and Baden-Württemberg-7 % more than in Lower Saxony. It is striking that North Rhine-Westphalia has the lowest share of private-for-profit nursing homes (27 %). Around 8 % of nursing homes in North Rhine-Westphalia are part of another health care facility; 20 % offer nursing care at home and 9 % provide part-time care. The comparison states as a whole show slightly higher figures. Furthermore, there is substantial variation across the federal states in beds per room and in the size of the nursing homes measured in number of places offered. NRW shows higher proportions of larger nursing homes. Finally, NRW has by far the most urban areas and a high income level. Only Baden-Würt-temberg shows a higher income per citizen.
For a deeper understanding of the price setting mechanism in different federal states, we conducted 25 in-depth telephone or personal interviews with individuals taking part in negotiation processes on the payer (9 interviews) or on the provider (13 interviews) side 3 . Additionally, three interviews were performed with neutral experts recommended by interviewees. Interviews were semi-structured, providing subjective information regarding inter alia specifics in each federal state's method of the collective bargaining process. All interviews were conducted in 2007 and lasted between 1 and 2 h. Notes were taken with the permission of each respondent 4 . To sum up, the results of the interviews suggested that price differences are due to different staffing levels, differences in adherence to collective wage agreements, housing prices and special institutional conditions in the federal states. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that the payers are supposed to take on a ''softer'' negotiation style in NRW than in other federal states. In general, the negotiations in NRW are based more on the internal cost structure of the respective nursing home while external benchmarks, i.e. comparisons with other providers, are used less often [15] .
In a least-squared framework we model the average price of care ARR ik as follows
The index i refers to the nursing home and k to the district. N ik indicates the federal state of North RhineWestphalia (NRW dummy), i.e. the comparison states as a whole are the baseline. R ik includes the residents' characteristics: the share of residents by care level and the average age and age squared of the residents in nursing home i in district k. H ik contains characteristics of the nursing home i in district k: FTE per resident, dummies for ownership with private not-for-profit nursing homes being the baseline, beds per room, dummies for size, being part of another facility, and provision of part-time or home care. The district vector D k bears the share of private nursing homes, the degree of rurality and the average income per citizen in district k. Finally, e ik is the stochastic error term. We start with the simplest regression model, which only includes the dummy variable N ik for NRW. This regression shows the raw difference in ARR ik between NRW and the other federal states. Stepwise we expand the model with the resident, nursing home and market characteristics. This allows us to assess the impact of additional variables on the price difference captured by the coefficient of N ik in the simplest specification. Mukamel and Spector [16] showed differing effects of ownership in different regions. Therefore, we include an interaction between N ik and ownership. In the final specification, we also include an interaction term of FTE per resident with N ik , because staff is the most important cost driver for nursing homes, which should be reflected in higher prices. If the institutions in NRW indeed negotiate differently concerning personnel costs as suggested by the results of the interviews, this interaction should capture differences in regards to staffing costs. Table 4 shows the regression results for ten model specifications. In model 1 the raw difference in ARR between NRW and the comparison states is estimated at €8.97, i.e. the coefficient shows exactly the difference in ARR between NRW and the comparison states, which can be seen in Table 3 . The ARR in the comparison states amounts to €72.13 (constant in model 1 of Table 4 and average ARR of comparison states in Table 3 ) and in NRW to €81.10 (constant plus the estimated coefficient of the NRW dummy in Table 4 and ARR of NRW in Table 3 ), i.e. 12.4 % higher.
Results
Step by step, we include further variables and have a look at the changes of the estimated coefficient of the NRW dummy. If it decreases, the added variables explain part of the price difference.
In model 2, we include the individual distribution of the residents. The price difference increases to €9.01 as in NRW there is a larger share of less severe cases than in the other regions. Therefore, NRW should actually be less expensive. Controlling for the average age and average age squared of the residents (model 3) has no impact on the price difference. In model 4 we add ownership. The price difference drops to €7.85. Adding FTEs per resident (model 5), the difference does not alter. The ownership structure seems to explain about 15 % of the price differences between NRW and the comparison states. Controlling for other characteristics of the nursing homes such as being part of another facility, provision of community care or part-time care, and beds per room (model 6) and size (model 7), the price differences increase slightly to €8.09 and drops to €7.88, respectively. Once we add the regional control variables (model 8), the price difference drops by €1.70 in comparison to model 7. The share of private homes, which might indicate stronger competition, significantly decreases the prices. So does the degree of rurality. Higher disposable income in the district increases the average price. Taking all these factors into account we can explain around 30 % of the raw price difference between NRW and the comparison states.
In model 9 we include the interactions of ownership and location. The interaction between private-for-profit and the NRW dummy shows a significant positive effect, i.e. the price difference between public nursing homes and privatefor-profit nursing homes is smaller in NRW than in other federal states. The price difference decreases by another €0.34. In the last model we include the interaction between FTE per resident and NRW dummy (model 10). The interaction is highly significant, i.e. more FTEs in NRW increase remuneration rates significantly. The price difference drops by nearly €3.20. Thus, this interaction explains by far most of the price difference between NRW and the comparison states. However, the NRW dummy still remains significantly positive, showing a daily price difference at about €2.60. In sum, observable characteristics explain about 70 % of the raw price difference between NRW and the other states; 30 % remains unexplained.
Discussion
The empirical analyses show that characteristics of residents, nursing homes and the respective district explain roughly 30 % of the observed price difference between NRW and the comparison states. Once we take the interaction between number of FTEs per resident and NRW dummy as well as ownership and NRW dummy into account, we can explain another 40 % of the difference. As suggested by some of our interviewees, a different kind of negotiation in NRW might explain the large impact of the interaction term of FTE and the NRW dummy. The interviewees stated that in NRW additional personnel costs of nursing homes might be more easily accepted as a driver of prices in negotiations with the LTCI and social assistance than in other federal states. In other states higher staffing levels tend to be regarded as a matter for the provider. If they are exceeding regional norm patterns, they are not considered in the negotiation process for setting daily rates [6] . For example, in Lower Saxony, the least expensive federal state, price negotiations strongly take into account the prices of local competitors-independent of the internal cost structure of the negotiating nursing home. This interpretation is in line with the explanation we received in the interviews [15] . Finally, roughly 30 % of the raw price difference remains unexplained by observable characteristics. Considering the around 150,000 residents living in nursing homes located in North Rhine-Westphalia, this unexplained daily difference of around €2.6 is of economic importance. In total, residents, their relatives or social assistance in NRW pay between 40 and 240 million euros per year more for nursing homes than residents in comparable states. We have calculated these figures with the upper and lower bound of the 95 % confidence interval of the point estimate of the NRW dummy in the last estimation model. Using the point estimate of €2.6 itself, this adds up to around 140 million euros per year.
Some limitations remain in our analyses. First, further analyses should try to incorporate investment costs. However, IC has to be derived from other data sources as it is not part of the data provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Second, as we cannot measure differences in quality or in services of care, it is not possible to judge whether price differences can be justified by different quality levels or by offering more or other services. Recent studies have shown a significant, but in size negligible correlation between some quality measures and remuneration rates [17, 18] . Furthermore, the concept of long-term care is defined uniformly by social law ensuring the comparability of basic services. Third, we have not been able to test empirically whether nursing homes in NRW pay wages according to the collective wage agreements more so than in other states. A separate analysis with census data showed a 6 % higher income of nurses in NRW compared to the other federal states [15] . However, this effect would also be captured in the interaction effect between FTEs and the NRW dummy. We cannot disentangle the effects of different negotiation styles and generally paying higher wages in NRW. While the first would be a clear inefficiency in the system, the latter is ambiguous.
Conclusion
This article is the first that analyses the determinants of remuneration rates in particular with respect to North Rhine-Westphalia, where-on average-prices are more than 12 % higher than in other large West German federal states. We find that 30 % of that price difference can be attributed to characteristics of residents, nursing homes and the respective district. Another 40 % of the difference can be can be explained by a different kind of negotiation in NRW; 30 % remain unexplained. Given the unexplained part, residents of nursing homes in NRW are charged with, roughly, an additional 140 million euros per year. Since the number of people in need of care will increase considerably in the future [19] , the burden of high prices will rise as well. Furthermore, future pensions of the elderly might be lower in real terms than today, so purchasing power of the average resident is likely to shrink, which will increase the burden for relatives and social assistance. It is up to the public and the policy makers to decide whether they are willing to pay higher prices per year for what an interviewee called ''institutional inheritance: Even before introduction of the LTCI in Germany, prices of nursing homes in NRW have been higher. Nowadays, there are extrapolated''.
Our empirical results in conjunction with the results from our interviews indicate potential inefficiencies in the collective bargaining process between LTCI and social assistance on the one side and the nursing home on the other. The payer side in NRW is supposed to accept the internal cost structure more easily, e.g. regarding personnel costs of the nursing homes, which does not set incentives for cost savings on the provider side. In Lower Saxony negotiations are strongly driven by prices of local competitors, so additional services might not get reimbursed [6] , hindering improvements for residents. One solution could be to give up collective bargaining altogether and instead use market pricing.
In Germany, financial assistance of the LTCI is independent of the individual remuneration rates of nursing homes. Benefits of LTCI depend only on the level of care of the resident. Thus, differences in the remuneration rates between nursing homes are carried in total by the resident or by their relatives and social assistance. Therefore, a market could show a strong price competition. Market prices would have the additional advantage that assessing differences in remuneration rates, which has been the purpose of this article, would be obsolete. Price regulations comparable to the rental market would be sufficient. This would allow nursing homes to compete in price, service and quality for residents. However, before the introduction of market pricing less regulation and more transparency would be needed in the market. So far differences in services can only be found by comparing individual brochures of nursing homes making a systematic comparison of services difficult. A readily available publication of offered services and prices, which is in not given for most areas in Germany at the moment [6] , would allow assessing value for money. Quality information could then be used to guarantee the adherence to the offered services. To this end, the so-called ''transparency reports'' assessing the quality of a nursing home with school marks have to be improved substantially beforehand 5 . Currently, the ''transparency reports'' can only be seen as a step into the right direction. So, while we think that market pricing could be of benefit, not all conditions required for its introduction have been met yet.
